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In this paper I consider 28 developed and developing countries, in the period 1980-
1995, and I employ the Within Group and the Generalized Method of Moments es-
timators to test, respectively, for Total Factor Productivity determinants and labor-
productivity convergence driving forces (i.e.capital accumulation and technological
catch-up) in diﬀerent manufacturing sectors, identiﬁed according the technological
content of their production. Moreover, I test for inter-sectoral and cross-country het-
erogeneity of labor productivity convergence tendencies.
My results show that technology growth rate is enhanced by technological transfer, in
all manufacturing sectors and countries, and that cross-country convergence is deter-
mined by technology diﬀusion rather than capital accumulation. Further, I ﬁnd that
the rate of technological convergence appears higher in emerging economies, partic-
ularly in High Tech sectors. Finally, tertiary education seems to be relatively more
important, as absorptive capability, than secondary one.
JEL Classiﬁcation Code: O14, O47, L60.
Keywords: Classical and Technological Convergence, Absorption Capabilities, Technolog-
ical Gap, TFP growth, Manufacturing sectors, Panel data
11 Introduction
A major problem in neoclassical growth theory is that the determinant of long run labour
productivity growth rates, namely eﬃciency improvements over time, or technological
change, are determined outside the model and so remain unexplained. In response to
this weakness, the theory of endogenous growth emerged in the mid of 1980s. The main
characteristic of ‘new growth theories’ is that they drop the neoclassical assumption of
diminishing returns to capital, formalising an endogenous mechanism through which tech-
nical change takes places. In other words, the force that shifts out the production frontier
is determined within the model and, thus, it is endogenous.
In a multicountry setting, where countries that have reached diﬀerent stage of economic
development interact, the endogenous mechanism that leads to technological change is
identiﬁed by the innovation-imitation dynamics (Grossman and Helpman (1991); Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1997); Aghion and Howitt (1998)).
In particular, if the country is technologically developed endogenous technological change
is lead by innovation (i.e. R&D), while if the country is developing technical change is lead
by imitation activities and absorption capability, which is, paraphrasing Rogers (2004),
the ability to access and fruitfully exploit new technological knowledge.
A synthetic representation of innovation-imitation dynamics is provided by the technolog-
ical gap idea, originally formulated by Nelson and Phelps(1966).1
In this context, economies are distinguished into the leader, which is the country having
the higher technological (or eﬃciency) level in a certain period, and all the others, called
followers.
To model technological change in follower economies it is assumed that the level of eﬃ-
ciency depends on country and period characteristics as well as on technological gap, which
proxies the technological and organizational transfer from the technology-leader country
(Dorwick and Nguyen (1989); Verspagen (1991); Bernard and Jones(1996a); Bernard and
Jones(1996b); Harrigan(1999); Dowrick and Rogers(2002); Griﬃth et al.(2004); Scarpetta
1In their seminal work, Nelson and Phelps use the technological gap idea to describe the technological
dynamics of an industry. The extension of the framework to the study of cross-country technological
interaction is due to Hansson and Herkson(1994).
2and Tressel (2004), Bianchi and Menegatti (2005)). This implies that technological growth
in the frontier economy accelerate technical change in laggard economies by widening their
production possibility set. Thus, it is presumed that, for subsequent long run technologi-
cal and output growth, the process of assimilating existing technologies in less developed
countries is not unlike that of creating entirely new technologies in the developed ones
(Pack and Westphal (1986)).
At this point, it is interesting to notice that cross-country conditional convergence pre-
diction, that is, once structural diﬀerences have been equalised, poor economies’ labour
productivity levels will approach in the long run the ones of their richer counterparts, can
originate from both neoclassical framework and from the theory of technological transfer.
In particular, while the Solow (1957) model, assuming decreasing marginal productivity of
capital, foretells that laggard countries in the short run will exhibit higher rates of output
growth, due to their relative faster pace of capital accumulation; in endogenous growth
literature, convergence tendencies arise because, although innovation tends to increase
labour productivity and technological diﬀerences between countries, technological diﬀu-
sion tends to decrease them (Fagerberg (1988)). Such a convergence process, originated
by technological transfer is know in the literature as technological catch-up.2
Thus, two are the theoretical cross-country convergence driving forces: capital accumula-
tion (i.e. neoclassical convergence inner driver) and technological transfer (i.e. endogenous
or Schumpeterian engine of growth).
In the spirit of the seminal contribution of Dorwick and Rogers (2002), this paper attempts
to reconcile neoclassical and technological catch-up traditions, looking at convergence de-
terminants in manufacturing sectors.
The reason because I concentrate on industrial production, rather than on whole GDP, is
that I believe that the main technological convergence eﬀect might show up in this sector.
In fact, as outlined by Lall (2001), manufacturing production has become increasingly
world integrated and, then, technological transfer from developed to developing countries
is likely to take place.
In particular, my original contribution focuses on manufacturing compartments. That
2See Rogers (2003) for an excellent review on technological catch-up literature.
3diﬀerent sectors might exhibit heterogeneous convergence tendencies rests on the premise
that industrial production does have neither an homogeneous capital intensity nor an ho-
mogeneous technological content. So, convergence inner drivers and rate of convergence
can be expected to diﬀer at sectoral level.
To analyse this possibility, following Lall (2000) taxonomy, I divided industrial produc-
tion into diﬀerent categories according to their technological content. The categories used
are: Resource Based (RB), in which the value of the production is essentially given by
the possession of primary resources (e.g. processed food, manufactured tobacco, reﬁned
petroleum products, processed glass and metals); Low Technology (LT), which includes
all the industries whose Research and Development (R&D) expenditure is below the 1%
of sales’ value (e.g. garments, footwear, pottery and cutlery); Medium Technology (MT),
where R&D expenditure accounts for more than 1% and less of 4% of sales (e.g. auto-
motive industry, perfumery, fertilizers, pesticides, textile and agricultural machinery); and
High Technology (HT), where the R&D expenditure is greater than 4% of sale’s value (e.g.
electronics, medical instruments and aerospace).
The only works, among the ones I am aware of, that have attempted a similar analysis
are the ones of Bernard and Jones (1996a) and Bernard and Jones (1996b). In particular,
they provide a descriptive empirical analysis of classical and technological convergence,
employing a neoclassical model augmented by a technological catch-up term and human
capital, disaggregating GDP into primary, secondary and tertiary productive activities.
According to their results, capital accumulation in the main convergence driving force,
because labour productive tendency to converge among countries is greater that techno-
logical catch-up degree.
The present work diﬀers from the recent applied literature on convergence inner drivers in
two further respects.
Evaluating the relative strength of capital accumulation and technological transfer for
cross country convergence represents a multitask objective. It requires, ﬁrst, to properly
model technological diﬀusion and, second , the reduced form employed for empirical anal-
ysis must allow to distinguish among the two potential convergence forces.
To accomplish the ﬁrst requirement, I explicitly verify whether the representations of tech-
4nological transfer process employed, all based on technological gap idea, are supported by
data. In particular, I test whether technological gap and absorption capabilities, proxied
by secondary and tertiary education, boost technology growth. As Griﬃth et al.(2004) and
Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), my results support the hypothesis that technological growth
rate is enhanced by technological transfer, in all manufacturing sectors and countries.
The second requisite is satisﬁed employing an original framework that combines neoclas-
sical and endogenous growth theories of technological catch-up, in the spirit of Bianchi
and Menegatti (2005). In fact, among the models I am aware of, the only ones that allow
for testing simultaneously technological and classical conditional convergence, through the
separation of capital deepening and technology diﬀusion terms, are the ones of Bianchi and
Menegatti (2005) and Pigliaru (2003). My preference towards the ﬁrst one is motivated
by the fact the empirical implementation of Pigliaru (2003) framework seems to be very
diﬃcult, unless one is ready to assume that cross-country growth regressors in a panel
data setting are strictly exogenous (in fact no empirical testing is provided).
My results, obtained employing the within group instrumental variable estimator, show
that cross-country convergence determinants vary across sectors. In particular, I ﬁnd that
technological transfer constitutes the main driving force in Medium, High Technology and
Resource Based sectors while both diminishing returns to capital and technological trans-
fer play a role in Low Technology. Thus, it can be observed that technological diﬀusion is
likely to lead long-run cross-country labour productivity equalisation in the most techno-
logically dynamic sectors.
Moreover, the fastest speed of technological catch-up is found in HT. This supports the
hypothesis that these industries are the ones opening the better prospects in terms of value
added growth, especially from laggard economies perspective.
Finally, it is observed that tertiary education, better fulﬁlling the capabilities requirements
needed to fruitfully exploit the existing technological gap, enhances technological transfer
more than secondary education.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents formally how technological trans-
fer among leader and followers has been modeled. In the third I derive the reduced form
adopted for subsequent empirical analysis. In the fourth details on data sources and esti-
5mation technique employed are provided. In the ﬁfth part, the results obtained on both
technological growth determinants and convergence driving forces are discussed. Final
remarks and policy implications conclude.
The appendix illustrates the superlative index number methodology employed to compute
technological variables.
2 Technology growth determinants: a formal representation
In the multicountry setting considered here, where economies are separated into the leader
(i.e. the country having the higher eﬃciency level) and the followers, the key issue for con-
vergence tendencies is how rapidly the discoveries made in leading country diﬀuse to the
others.
Assuming that value added in each economy is produced according to a standard neoclas-
sical production technology,3 the level of eﬃciency in follower country i at date t (i.e. Ait)
is modeled as a ﬁrst order autoregressive distributed lag [ADL(1,1)] process, such that
eﬃciency level in i is cointegrated with the one of leader economy, L. Formally:
lnAit = α1lnAit−1 + α2lnALt + α3lnALt−1 (1)
Assuming long-run homogeneity (i.e. α2+α3/(1−α1) = 1) and considering an idiosyncratic
error term, Equation (1) can be rewritten in its Error Correction Model form as:4






where ln(ALt−1/Ait−1) is usually called technological gap. This term represents the dis-
tance from the technological frontier and captures the potential for technology transfer
(Griﬃth et al.(2004), p.886).
Explicitly considering a constant country speciﬁc component of followers’ technical progress,
3The neoclassical production function is characterised for being homogeneous of degree 1 and for ex-
hibiting diminishing marginal returns to each cumulative factor of production.
4Equation (2) is obtained subtracting lnAit−1 from each side of (1) and adding and subtracting
α2(lnALjt−1) to the right hand side.
6gi, and a time speciﬁc term, gt,5 Dowrick and Rogers (2002) provide a panel data speci-
ﬁcation of technological catch-up process. This is done rewriting Equation (2) as follows:






Thus, if follower countries are beneﬁting from technological transfer the coeﬃcient φ will
be positive. In particular, φ can be interpreted as the ‘speed’ of technology diﬀusion due
to technological transfer potential (i.e. technological gap).
Finally, to take into explicit consideration that technogical gap can enhance technology
growth when the recipient economy possess the appropriate capacities, technological gap
is operatively interacted with absorption capabilities, represented by Ψit. Thus, Equation
(3) can be rewritten as:








where, coeﬃcient η corresponds to the speed of diﬀusion due to eﬀective technological
transfer (i.e. technological gap and absorption capabilities).
It is worth noticing that diﬀerent scholars have given diﬀerent interpretations of techno-
logical reception process. For example, in the view of Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) absorption capabilities are proxied by human capital, while for
Sachs and Warner (1997) they are mostly related to trade openness; ﬁnally Hansson and
Henrekson (1994) consider both human capital and trade openness. As mentioned, in this
paper I will concentrate on human capital.
To conclude, I brieﬂy illustrate the empirical counterparts of technological variables of
interest:
• the level of technical eﬃciency is approximated employing Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) or Solow residual, calculated according the superlative index methodology of
















5Note that leader’s technological change, being the same for all followers, can be interpreted as a
component of the time speciﬁc term.
7Further details on this method can be found in the Appendix;
• technological gap is computed subtracting TFP of country i from leader economy’s
TFP:
TFPgapit = TFPLt − TFPit
• TFP growth in country i is represented by the diﬀerence of two TFP index calculated
at diﬀerent points of time:
git = TFPit − TFPit−1
3 Classical vs technological convergence: the model
The framework I use to test the relative strength of capital accumulation and technological
transfer as convergence driving forces combines the neoclassical and endogenous represen-
tations of economic growth process. This is done relaxing the hypothesis of a common
technology growth rate among countries from the textbook Solow model. In particular, the
technological catch-up hypothesis is adopted. Thus, variations in countries’ output growth
rates are explained by relative distance from steady state together with both decreasing
returns to capital and international technology transfer. Hence, it is possible to test both
neoclassical and endogenous growth mechanism of convergence. A similar speciﬁcation is
provided by Bianchi and Menegatti(2005).
To begin, I brieﬂy recap the basic hypothesis and results of the neoclassical model in
a multicountry setting, without explicitly considering sectoral diﬀerences, for notational
convenience.





where Yit, Kit and At stand respectively for output, capital stock and labour augment-
ing technology in country i, at time t. Note that Kit can be constituted by both physical
and human capital, as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Here, for simplicity, I take
8only physical capital stock into consideration.
Proceeding with the set-up of Solow model, capital stock is accumulated at ﬁxed rate, si,
and depreciates at rate δ while labour input Lit grows at the constant rate n:
˙ Kit = siYit − δKit
Lit = L0ent
In the neoclassical model, a country and time invariant technology growth rate, equal to
g, is assumed:
At = A0egt
Diﬀerently, I am going to assume that technical growth rate is country and time speciﬁc:
Ait = A0egitt (6)
where git is speciﬁed as in Equation (3).
A well know result of the neoclassical model is that the growth rate of output in unit of
eﬀective labour (i.e. ˆ y = Y/AL) is proportional to countries’ distance from steady state
(i.e.ˆ y∗). In formal terms:








where γˆ y indicates output growth rate and b = (1 − α)(g + n + δ). Parameter b indicates
how rapidly economy’s output per eﬀective worker approaches its steady state value.
Solving the diﬀerential equation in Equation (7) and subtracting lnˆ yi0 from both side,
the following estimable equation is obtained, after having explicitly expressed steady state
output level:





[ln(s) − ln(g + n + δ)] + ǫit (8)
where β = (1 − e−bt). Whether the conditional convergence hypothesis is rejected or not
depends on the coeﬃcient on initial output level, β: if negative, conditional convergence
prediction can not be rejected. Starting from these results, I turn to derive the reduced
9form of my model.
To begin, I group steady state proxies into variable Xit and I indicate β ∗ (α/1 − α) as γ,
such that:
lnˆ yit − lnˆ yi0 = −βlnˆ yi0 + γXit + ǫit (9)
Since Equation (9) is expressed in unobservable units of eﬀective labour, it can be
rewritten in per capita terms (i.e. y=Y/L) and it can be solved for a discrete time period.
These transformations are particularly useful for empirical work. In formal terms, value



















Xit + ǫit (10)














Xit + ǫit (11)











[lnA0 + αlnki0] +
γ
t
Xit + ǫit (12)
Finally, noting that the terms in initial technological levels cancel out and substituting

















Xit + ǫit (13)
where e β is β multiplied by α.
Finally, explicitly considering physical and human capital accumulation rates, sK and sH,
as steady state proxies, and grouping all time invariant terms but country speciﬁc terms





















lnsHit + ǫit (14)
As in Bianchi and Menegatti (2005), the separation of initial country speciﬁc capital
stock and technological level (i.e. TFPgap) allows to test for both classical and techno-
logical conditional convergence simultaneously.
In particular, neoclassical conditional convergence is found when the coeﬃcient multiply-
ing initial capital is negative. That is, due to capital diminishing marginal productivity,
countries relatively close to steady-state will experience a slowdown in growth.
Concerning technological conditional convergence, this hypothesis is not rejected if coeﬃ-
cient φ, which represents the speed of technological catch-up due to technological transfer
potential, is positive.
























Also in this case neoclassical conditional convergence hypothesis is not rejected when
the coeﬃcient multiplying initial capital is negative and for technological conditional con-
vergence the parameter η, which stands for technological catch-up speed due to eﬀective
technological transfer, must be positive.
4 Data and estimation technique
The dataset I use comprises the following variables observed at annual intervals from 1980
to 1995, for 28 developed and developing countries6:
• Labour productivity;
• Steady state proxies: physical and human capital accumulation rates;
6See Table 1 for sample details
11• Absorption capabilities proxies: secondary and tertiary schooling attainment rate;
• Total Factor Productivity (TPF) Growth, TFP levels and TFP Gap.
All these variables but the schooling ones are disaggregated by technological sector, ac-
cording to Lall (2000) taxonomy.
Labour productivity, in each country and sector, is measured as manufacturing value
added per worker and it is denominated in 1996 international dollars. Data are expressed
in 1996 international dollars to allow international and intertemporal comparisons. They
are obtained combining UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database 2004, at 3-digits of ISIC
Code (Revision 2), World Bank Development Indicators and the latest version of Penn
World Tables. In particular, from UNIDO I collected disaggregated data on workers and
on manufacturing value added in Local Currency Unit (LCU); from World Bank Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI), GDP data in LCU; ﬁnally, from Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1),
GDP data expressed in Purchasing Power Parity. After having calculated sectoral value
added in manufacturing as percentages of GDP, using World Bank and UNIDO data in
LCU, I combined such percentages ﬁgures with WDI and PWT6.1. My preferred measure
of real value added in manufacturing is based on Penn World Tables Real GDP Chain In-
dex (RGDPCH). This is because RGDPCH does not suﬀer from the so-called ‘Laspeyres
ﬁxed-based problem’ and, then, it is the most appropriate measure when intertemporal
comparisons are at issue.7
Initial capital stock data come from originally estimated sectoral capital stock series.8
Physical capital accumulation rates are calculated as Gross Fixed Capital Formation share
to manufacturing value added. Both series are taken from UNIDO database.
To proxy human capital accumulation rate in each country, I use the average years of
schooling in the population over age 15. This series comes from Barro and Lee(2000)
dataset, which reports schooling variables only at ﬁve years interval. To overcome this
diﬃculty, I interpolate the available data implicitly assuming that the between-observed
values lie on a straight line.9
7Summers and Heston (1991).
8See for further details Improving PIM to measure capital stock. Any implication for growth? comprised
in the present thesis.
9My preference towards population over age 15, instead of 25, which is also available in Barro and Lee
dataset, is motivated by the fact that working age in developing countries can be quite low. See for further
12Absorption capabilities are proxied by human capital indicators as in the tradition of
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Baumol (1986), Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Rogers (2004). In
particular, I choose secondary and tertiary schooling attainment rate. Both series are
taken from Barro and Lee(2000) dataset.
All technological variables are estimated employing the superlative index number approach
introduced by Caves(1982a) and Caves et al.(1982b) , using the previously mentioned data
sources. Further details on this methodology can be found in the Appendix, while their
empirical counterparts have been presented in Section 2.
Turning to the estimation technique, I employ the within group estimator to test for both
technology growth determinants and conditional convergence inner drivers .
In both cases, I begin my empirical analysis undertaking a battery of Hausmann test. This
is done to evaluate whether country’ unobserved heterogeneity has to be modelled as ﬁxed
eﬀect or random eﬀect.
Having rejected random eﬀect hypothesis in all sectors and countries, in both TFP growth
determinants and conditional convergence analysis, the within group estimator can be
thought as the best choice, in terms of consistency and eﬃciency.
In the case of TFP growth determinants, all results reported are consistent with the hy-
pothesis of non-spherical error terms.
In the analysis of classical and technological conditional convergence, I explicitly take into
account the possibility of endogenous regressors using Instrumental Variables. In particu-
lar, all regressors were instrumented with the value of their ﬁrst lag.
To take time heterogeneity, ξt, into account I included a set of relevant time dummies as
done by Islam (1995) and Griﬃth et al. (2004).
5 Results
5.1 TFP growth determinants
In this section I examine the role played by technological gap and absorption capabilities
in determining technology growth rates. The analysis are carried by sector, according
details Bennell(1996).
13to Lall’s technological taxonomy, and by country, separating developed economies from
developing ones. The latter distinction is important because it allows to check whether
technological transfer process is taking place in both type of countries.
To begin, I analyse descriptively technological variables data. I identify which countries
have higher and lower TFP indexes, reporting the highest two (i.e. the leader and the
most productive country among the followers) and the lowest one. Moreover, to have an
idea of TFPgap distribution along time, I provide informations on the mean and standard
deviation of the exponent of the negative of the TFPgap, exp(−TFPgap). This measure
corresponds to each country’s TFP as a proportion of leader’s TFP. It has the great
advantage of being positive and, then, easy to interpret: the closer to 1, the smaller the
TFPgap and, then, the closer to leader’s technical level.
From Table 2, it can be observed that USA is the leader country in all sectors and that
Japan represents its immediate follower, although with some few exceptions. Regarding
laggard countries, India and Bangladesh, the only least developed countries in my sample,
have the sad record of least eﬃcient economies.
Turning to TFPgap distribution features, it could be noticed that in Low, Medium and
High Technology sectors the mean of TFPgap measure is greater in 1995 than it was in
1980; then, on average, countries did get closer to the leader. In Resource Based and
Manufacturing as a whole, on the other hand, such a measure seems stagnating or slightly
decreasing, although it must be remarked that Resource Based is the sector exhibiting the
lowest technical gap in the whole period. These results are consistent with the ones that
Griﬃth et al. (2004) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) obtain for OECD countries.
Finally, the standard deviation of TFPgap is decreasing in all sectors but Low Tech where
it is constant. This means that, in the period considered, countries not only did get closer
to the leader but also to each other. The same is found by Griﬃth et al. (2004).
Table 3 reports the results of technological growth determinants (i.e. Equations (3) and
(4)). It can be seen that diﬀerent measures of human capital are considered in constructing
the interaction terms, in particular the following speciﬁcations of technological transfer
process are adopted:
1. ∆TFPit = φ(TFPgapt−1) + uit
142. ∆TFPit = η1(AverageY earsofSchoolingt−1 ∗ TFPgapt−1) + uit
3. ∆TFPit = η2(%Pop.Sec.Sc.t−1 ∗ TFPgapt−1) + uit
4. ∆TFPit = η3(%Pop.Tert.Sc.t−1 ∗ TFPgapt−1) + uit
As Griﬃth et al. (2004) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), my results support the
hypothesis that technological growth rate is enhanced by technological transfer. In fact, a
signiﬁcative positive correlation is found between ∆TFPit and TFPgap considered alone
or interacted with human capital measures.
Then, distinguishing among countries, it can be noticed that the impact of technological
gap is greater for developing than developed countries, in all sectors but Medium and
High Tech. This ﬁnding can be motivated recalling what Baumol(1986) deﬁnes product
mix and that is usually indicated as appropriate technological gap in technological catch-up
literature (Rogers (2003)).10 The idea is that not all available technical knowledge beneﬁt
laggard economies. In other words, some countries can be so far behind the technological
frontier that, although having a great technological transfer potential (i.e. large techno-
logical gap), they can eﬀectively absorb very little technology. Thus, it seems that the
technological gap in MT and HT is not appropriate for developing countries, in the sense
that it can not beneﬁt laggard economies’ technological growth in the short run.
Then, turning to absorption capabilities, it can be seen from speciﬁcation 2 that an extra
year of schooling is worth more in developing countries than in developed ones (i.e. spec-
iﬁcation 2).
Moreover, it seems that the impact for technological catch-up of both secondary and ter-
tiary education is greater for developing than developed countries, in all sectors but High
Technology (i.e. speciﬁcations 3 and 4). This latter ﬁnding reinforces the claim that
frontier technological knowledge in this sector can not be easily transferred to developing
countries, because not ‘appropriate’.
Finally, it is worth noticing that secondary education is the most relevant schooling grade
10
(...) [a] less developed country that produces no cars can not beneﬁt from the invention and
adoption of a better car-producing robot in Japan.
Baumol (1986), p.1080.
On this point, see also David (1993) [p.240].
15for developing countries. Then, it could be said that secondary schooling properly com-
plements the relevant technological gap in laggard economies, thus favoring technological
growth. The same is true for tertiary education in developed countries. These results are
in line with the ones of Gemmell (1996).
5.2 Classical and technological convergence
In what follows I evaluate the relative strength of capital accumulation and technological
transfer as conditional convergence inner drivers. The analysis are made at sectoral level
without distinguishing between developed and developing countries. This is because the
focus here is on convergence tendencies between leader and followers and not on clustering
dynamics. 11
The speciﬁcations of yearly value added growth adopted are the following:
1. ∆lnyit = βlnkit−1 + φ(TFPgapt−1) + γ1 lnsKit + γ2lnsHit + ǫit
2. ∆lnyit = βlnkit−1 + η1(%Pop.Sec.Sc.t−1 ∗ TFPgapt−1) + γ1 lnsKit + γ2lnsHit + ǫit
3. ∆lnyit = βlnkit−1 + η2(%Pop.Ter.Sc.t−1 ∗ TFPgapt−1) + γ1 lnsKit + γ2lnsHit + ǫit
Table 4 reports estimation outcomes obtained for the three speciﬁcations.
In general terms, it could be noticed that conditional convergence hypothesis is supported
in all sectors. This means that developing countries are catching up with their richer coun-
terparts, in terms of labour productivity. Moreover, it is found that physical and human
capital accumulation rates are positively related with value added growth, although they
are not always signiﬁcant predictors.12 Similar results are found by Dowrick and Rogers
(2002).
More in detail, Table 4 shows that the nature and the speed of convergence vary across
sectors and technological transfer speciﬁcations.
Regarding the nature of convergence process, and then its inner drivers, it could be seen
11See for details the excellent review on empirical growth analysis of Durlauf, Johnson and Temple
(2005).
12See for further details on growth predictors’ robustness the 2 and 4 millions of regressions run in by
Sala-i-Martin (1997a) and Sala-i-Martin (1997b).
16that, Low Technology sectors exhibit both classical (i.e. negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient on initial capital stock) and technological convergence (i.e. positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on TFPgap and interaction terms), with the only exception of speciﬁcation (3);
Medium and High Technology together with Resource Based show exclusively technologi-
cal conditional convergence; and, ﬁnally, Manufacturing as whole, being literally the sum
of the various compartments, presents, as expected, mixed evidence.
This kind of evidence partially agrees with Dowrick and Rogers (2002), who ﬁnd that
both capital accumulation and technological diﬀusion are determinant for long run cross-
country equalisation of GDP per worker, while it disagrees with Bianchi and Menegatti
(2005) and Bernard and Jones (1996a) and Bernard and Jones (1996b), who, employing
extremely diﬀerent datasets from mine, support only classical conditional convergence.
The result of cross-country classical and technological conditional convergence in LT can
be motivated taking into account the intrinsic characteristics of these industries. In par-
ticular, these sectors are traditionally labour intensive and the techniques involved are
relatively simple and almost mature. Then, on one hand, it can be claimed that capital
stock exhibits diminishing marginal returns, thus supporting classical convergence predic-
tion; and, on the other, technological convergence seems also likely because the highly
standardised production processes might be imitated quite easily by developing countries.
In the case of MT and HT the ﬁnding that technological transfer, and not capital accumu-
lation, is the convergence inner driver can be explained considering the high technological
dynamism these sectors exhibit, in both developed and developing countries. In fact, it
is true that knowledge intense sectors channel the greatest amount of R&D eﬀorts in ad-
vanced economies and that, in the last thirty years, an unprecedented process of technology
transfer from North to South has taken place in these industries (UNIDO (2002); UNC-
TAD (2002)). Through the means of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), licensing, exports
of capital goods, migration of skill workers, world top Multinational Corporations, which
happen to be in the High Tech business, have started to diﬀuse technologies developed at
home, both to re-locate their production or to enter new factor and ﬁnal good markets
(UNCTAD (2005)).
Regarding RB, technological conditional convergence evidence can be interpreted taking
17into account both the great importance of such industries for developing countries’ exports
and the massive process of mechanisation such compartments have experienced in the re-
cent years. For example, as noticed by Lall (2000), modern food and metal processing,
requires the use of very advanced techniques, especially when international standards have
to be met. Thus, it might be claimed that, laggard economies, traditionally competing in
world market through RB productions, could beneﬁt from technological transfer enhanced
by international trade, according to the theoretical point of view of Sachs and Warner
(1997). Moreover, the increasingly mechanised nature of production could have entailed
frontier technological knowledge to be as important as in knowledge intense sectors, pro-
viding the necessary incentives to imitation.
At sectoral level, my analysis conﬁrms the hypothesis of non-homogeneous speed of tech-
nological convergence.
In particular, the fastest speed of technological catch-up is found in HT and the lowest in
LT sectors. Such diﬀerences can be explained considering that the returns of productive
activities have proved to be higher in knowledge intense than in traditional sectors. In par-
ticular, Lall (1997) notices that in HT even labour intensive activities, such as assembly,
are more stable, skill-creating and externality generating than in LT. Thus, technological
catch-up appears faster in HT because these industries are the ones opening the better
prospects in terms of value added growth.
To conclude, I discuss the results provided by alternative speciﬁcations of technological
transfer.
Comparing Table 4 columns, it can be easily seen that the elasticity of output growth
with respect to technological gap terms increases its value when interacted with human
capital proxies. In particular, in speciﬁcation (1) output growth elasticity with respect to
technological transfer (i.e. coeﬃcient φ) is between 0.13 and 0.5 (i.e. to a point percentage
change in TFPgap value added growth increases between 0.2% and 0.5%), in speciﬁcation
(2) it increases almost to 2 and ﬁnally it is comprised between 1.1 and 7.8 in speciﬁcation
(3), where technological transfer is due not only to technological gap but also to tertiary
schooling.
The general comment that could be done is that the higher the school grade the better
18the potential for technological transfer is complemented, so the faster the technological
convergence rate or speed.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that these results conﬁrm the previous analysis on tech-
nology growth determinants, for all sectors and speciﬁcations, exception made for MT and
HT in speciﬁcation (3) (See ﬁrst column of Table 3). In particular, in knowledge intense
sectors, technological convergence speed seems the highest when TFPgap is interacted
with tertiary education and not with secondary education, as it could be expected looking
at Table 3.
On one hand, this ﬁnding might signal that the skills obtained in secondary schooling are
not suﬃcient to imitate and eﬀectively use frontier HT knowledge. On the other, it could
be claimed that tertiary education, which is highly subsidised in low income countries
(Glewwe and Kremer (2005)), is particularly valuable not only to progress in technical
knowledge (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)) but it brings also side eﬀects, such as positive
externalities, production linkages and general equilibrium eﬀects ((Schultz (2002); Strauss
and Thomas (1995)), which are crucial for output growth especially in developing countries.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides new empirical evidence on cross-country classical and technological
conditional convergence in manufacturing sectors, identiﬁed according to Lall (2000) tech-
nological taxonomy.
Instrumentally to main analysis, I verify that the representations of technological trans-
fer employed are supported by data. Similarly to Griﬃth et al. (2004) and Scarpetta
and Tressel (2004), my results conﬁrm the hypothesis that technological growth rate is
enhanced by technological transfer, in all manufacturing sectors and countries.
Turning to classical and technological convergence predictions, my results highlight that
cross-country convergence determinants vary across sectors. In particular, I ﬁnd that
technological transfer constitutes the main driving force in Medium, High Technology
and Resource Based sectors while both diminishing returns to capital and technological
transfer play a role in Low Technology. Thus, it can be observed that technological diﬀu-
19sion is likely to lead long-run cross-country labour productivity equalisation in the most
technologically dynamic sectors, where in the present multicountry setting technological
dynamism is represented by both innovation and imitation activities.13
Moreover, the fastest speed of technological catch-up is found in HT. This supports the
hypothesis that these industries are the ones opening the better prospects in terms of value
added growth, especially from laggard economies perspective.
The ﬁndings illustrated so far seem to conﬁrm that, in technological dynamic sectors,
technical progress (e.g. knowledge diﬀusion) counteracts the eﬀects of decreasing marginal
productivity, boosting long run output growth, as predicted by the seminal contribution
of Romer (1986).
Finally, it is observed that tertiary education, better fulﬁlling the capabilities requirements
needed to fruitfully exploit the existing technological gap, enhances technological transfer
more than secondary education.
From a policy perspective, this evidence shows that laggard economies can improve their
relative position. To catch-up with their richer counterparts, developing countries should
enter R&D intense industries and target their industrial policy towards the development
of dynamic advantages, such as knowledge and skills, rather than relying only on large
production capacity, cheap labour and abundant natural resources. In particular, as Lall
(2004) suggests, laggard economies have to ﬁnd an access to foreign technology, via formal
imports in both internalised and externalised forms (e.g. FDI and licesing, respectively).
Moreover, they have to build domestic absorption capabilities, such as advanced technical
skills acquired through tertiary education, and so, they have to provide institutional in-
frastructure for learning.
To conclude, I want to mention that an interesting further line of research could be in-
vestigating whether the results obtained are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the tech-
nological catch-up process. In particular, the hypothesis used here was that technological
improvements over time were a linear function of the technological gap.
What will the results be if technological change would allowed to be a non-linear function
13Remember that Resource Based productions are largely world integrated and have complex scale and
technical requirements, like Medium and High Technology sectors.
20of the technological gap? Will be ‘falling behind’ episodes and clustering tendencies likely
to happen?
The empirical test of cross-country convergence inner drivers through non parametric tech-
niques constitutes an exciting research challenge.
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Table 1: Country Sample
27Technological TFP 1980 1985 1990 1995
Sector
Resource Based
First TFP USA USA USA USA
Second TFP UK UK Australia Australia
Lowest TFP India India India India
Mean exp(-TFPgap) 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.44
SD exp(-TFPgap) 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.2
Low Tech.
First TFP USA USA USA USA
Second TFP Japan UK Japan Australia
Lowest TFP Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
Mean exp(-TFPgap) 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.40
SD exp(-TFPgap) 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26
Medium Tech.
First TFP USA USA USA USA
Second TFP Japan Japan Japan Japan
Lowest TFP India India Bolivia Bolivia
Mean exp(-TFPgap) 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.39
SD exp(-TFPgap) 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.22
High Tech.
First TFP USA USA USA USA
Second TFP Japan UK Japan Finland
Lowest TFP Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
Mean exp(-TFPgap) 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.39
SD exp(-TFPgap) 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22
Manufacturing
First TFP USA USA USA USA
Second TFP Japan Japan Japan Australia
Lowest TFP India Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
Mean exp(-TFPgap) 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.39
SD exp(-TFPgap) 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.22
Table 2: TFP descriptive statistics
28Dependant variable: ∆TFPit All Countries Developed Developing
Resource Based
(1) TFPgapt−1 .34 (.05) .28 (.05) .35 (.05)
(2) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Av.Sc. .05 (.008) .033 (.008) .08 (.01)
(3) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. .77 (.19) .34 (.13) 3.3 (.8)
(4) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. .92 (.22) .61 (.23) 1.04 (.3)
Low Technology
(1) TFPgapt−1 .3 (.062) .26 (.07) .3 (.07)
(2) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Av.Sc. .04 (.008) .02 (.007) .05 (.012)
(3) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. .97 (.22) .38 (.15) 2.67 (.71)
(4) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. .86 (.23) .65 (.25) .89 (.27)
Medium Technology
(1) TFPgapt−1 .28 (.04) .3 (.06) .28 (.05)
(2) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Av.Sc. .047 (.005) .035 (.007) .054 (.009)
(3) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. .86 (.18) .42 (.15) 3.57 (.65)
(4) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. .74 (.18) .69 (.18) .76 (.22)
High Technology
(1) TFPgapt−1 .27 (.05) .33 (.08) .25 (.06)
(2) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Av.Sc. .047 (.007) .037 (.008) .052 (.009)
(3) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. 1.1 (.16) .56 (.16) 2.5 (.60)
(4) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. .79 (.22) .9 (.32) .77 (.26)
Manufacturing
(1) TFPgapt−1 .28 (.06) .27 (.08) .28 (.07)
(2) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Av.Sc. .042 (.007) .03 (.008) .054 (.012)
(3) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. .61 (.15) .32 (.12) 2.1 (.66)
(4) TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. .63 (.19) .59 (.2) .64 (.24)
Table 3: Impact of Technological Transfer on TFP growth. Robust Std. Errors in Paren-
thesis
29Dependant variable: ∆lnyit Speciﬁcation Speciﬁcation Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3)
Resource Based
lnkit−1 -.04 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.07 (.07)
TFPgapt−1 .29*** (.08) – –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. – .68** (.32) –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. – – 2.39* (1.3 )
lnsKit .13*** (.04) .16*** (.04) .18***(.05)
lnsHit .32*** (.12) .1 (.15) .14 (.16)
cons -.1 (.71) .1 (.71) .9(.71)
F test that all ui = 0; P.value: .1 .1 .1
Low Technology
lnkit−1 -.09* (.06) -.11** (.06) -.1* (.06)
TFPgapt−1 .13** (.05) – –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. – .5* (.3) –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. – – 1.16 (1 )
lnsKit .02 (.035) .025 (.03) .03(.04)
lnsHit .22** (.11) .1 (.1) .1(.16)
cons .46 (.6) .1* (.6) 1*(.6)
F test that all ui = 0; P.value: .7 .9 .95
Medium Technology
lnkit−1 -.02 (.05) -.06 (.05) -.08* (.05)
TFPgapt−1 .25*** (.06) – –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. – .5* (.3) –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. – – 1.9* (1.08)
lnsKit .017 (.04) .023 (.045) .009(.04)
lnsHit .32*** (.12) .12 (.14) .14(.14)
cons -.63 (.56) .41 (.6) .6(.6)
F test that all ui = 0; P.value: .7 .88 .77
High Technology
lnkit−1 .16*** (.05) -.01 (.05) .012 (.05)
TFPgapt−1 .5*** (.06) – –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. – 1.9*** (.3) –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. – – 7.8*** (1.3)
lnsKit .05 (.05) .017(.05) .02(.05)
lnsHit .12 (.16) .35* (.19) .45**(.2)
cons -2.7*** (.6) .55 (.6) .6(.6)
F test that all ui = 0; P.value: .61 .72 .43
Manufacturing
lnkit−1 -.05(.05) -.08* (.04) -.08*(.04)
TFPgapt−1 .17*** (.05) – –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Sec.Sc. – .42* (.26) –
TFPgapt−1 ∗ Tert.Sc. – – .75 (.9 )
lnsKit .1*** (.03) .11***(.04) .11***(.04)
lnsHit .2**(.08) .06(.1) .12(.11)
cons .19 (.6) .9* (.6) .8(.5)
F test that all ui = 0; P.value: .5 .83 .94
Table 4: Whole sample. *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% signiﬁcance level.
30Appendix
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Solow residual is the part of output growth not
accounted for market transactions. It originates from growth accounting exercise and it
is conventionally employed to measure technological progress. Following Diewert (1976),
Caves et al. (1982b) derives an index number that allows TFP comparisons among coun-
tries. This index is superlative, meaning that is exact for the ﬂexible aggregator function
chosen (i.e. translog production function); and transitive, so that the choice of base coun-
try and year is inconsequential.14
Formally, I assume that value added of a generic country i is a function of capital stock
and employment; that is translog with identical second-order term; that constant returns
to scale apply and that inputs are measured perfectly and in the same units for each ob-
servation. In symbols:
lnyi = α0i + α1ilnli + α2ilnki + α3(lnli)2 + α4(lnki)2 + α5(lnli ∗ lnki)
Where constant returns to scale hypothesis requires α1i + α2i = 1 and 2α3 + α5 =
2α4 + α5 = 0.
I review Caves et al.(1982) contribution, beginning with TFP index number for bilateral
comparisons.
There are two countries, b and c; country b is the basis of comparison and the distance
function Dc(yb,lb,kb) represents the minimum proportional decrease in yb such that the
resulting output is producible with the inputs and productivity levels of c. Or, Dc(yb,lb,kb)
is the smallest input bundle capable of producing yb using the technology in country a. In
symbols:
Dc(yb,xb) = min{δ ∈ ℜ+ : fc(δxb) ≥ yb}
14Exact literally means that the resulting index is not an approximation. For details see Diewert (1976)
and its result on the use of Tornqvist-Theil approximation to the Divisia index. Flexible is an aggrega-
tor function that can provide a second order approximation to an arbitrary twice diﬀerentiable linearly
homogeneous function.
31where xb = (kb,lb).15 Assuming that producers are cost-minimisers and price takers
in input markets, it can be shown that the Malmquist index (i.e. the geometric mean) of















where a bar denotes an average over countries and σi = (αi + α)/2, where (αi) stands for
labour’s share in total costs for country i.
Similar reasoning can be applied to derive the multilateral version of TFP index, that
allows for TFP comparisons among more than two countries. Taking sectoral heterogeneity











where a bar denotes the geometric average over all countries for a given sector j and a
year t and ˜ σijt = (αijt + αj)/2, where αijt is labour share in country i and industryj and
αj is the cross-country average for industry j.
















As originally noticed by Harrigan (1997), the variability in actual labour shares over value
added makes diﬃcult the empirical implementation of Equation (3). To solve this problem
smoothed and not actual labour shares are usually employed.
Smoothed labour shares are simply obtained running a regression of actual labour shares
on a constant and the capital to labour ratio:16
αijt = ξi + ξj + χijln(Kijt/Lijt)
15This notation implies that only one homogeneous output is produced using only one homogeneous
input. For further details on productivity measurement in this simple and more complex environments
(i.e. multiple output-multiple input technologies), see Diewert (1992).
16This reduced form directly comes from the translog production function with constant returns to scale
hypothesis.
32Previous studies on developed countries, such as Harrigan (1997,1999) and Griﬃth et al.
(2004), consider only sectoral heterogeneity in slopes (i.e.χj). As I work also with develop-
ing countries, I improved such speciﬁcation, allowing for country and sector heterogeneity
in both intercepts and slopes, ξi, ξj and χij. In particular, to avoid a major loss in data
variability, due to many dummies, I grouped manufacturing sectors according Lall’s tax-
onomy and I divided my sample into developed and developing countries, using World
Bank deﬁnitions. The diagnostics employed strongly reject the null hypothesis of non-
heterogeneity in both intercepts and slopes among diﬀerent sectors and countries. More
precisely, using panel data F-tests, I have detected, separately, intercept heterogeneity
due to country and sector ﬁxed eﬀects. Through Chow type F-statistics, I have tested for
sector and country heterogeneity, in both slope and intercepts.
33